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Abstract
The incentive of providing protection of intellectual property has been analyzed, both for an emerg-
ing economy as well as for a developed economy. The optimal patent length and the optimal patent
breadth within a country are found to be positively related to each other for a fixed structure of
laws abroad. Moreover, a country can respond to stronger patent protection abroad by weakening
its patent protection under certain circumstances and by strengthening its patent protection under
other circumstances. These results depend upon the curvature of the R&D production function.
Finally, we investigate the impact of an increase in the willingness-to-pay in the emerging economy
and find conditions under which there is an improvement in both patent length as well as patent
breadth in the emerging economy.
1 Introduction
There has been a recent literature (summarized in Maskus (2000)) that analyze the determinants
of the Intellectual Property (henceforth, IP) laws. This article builds on this literature by examining
the incentive of a country in providing IP protection when R&D eﬀort is endogenously determined.
We analyze this incentive both for a developed economy as well as for an emerging economy. It is
natural to conjecture that in a two-country model, if one country improves its patent protection,
then the other country would free ride and reduce its own level of patent protection (Scotchmer
(2004a), p. 330). This conjecture generally holds if R&D eﬀort is assumed to be exogenous.
However, we show that if R&D eﬀort is endogenized, then such a conclusion can only hold under
certain circumstances. Indeed, it is possible to show that there are situations under which an
improvement in IP laws in the developed economy can lead to a simultaneous improvement of such
laws in the emerging economy. Our analysis can therefore be used to determine conditions under
which countries can free ride on each other in framing IP laws, and conditions under which they
"cooperate." Interestingly, in our model such "cooperation" can be achieved by countries acting in
their best interest, and not because of international treaties.
We also use our model to analyze conditions for convergence of IP laws between developed and
emerging economies. From the perspective of IP laws, the most important diﬀerences between
developed and emerging economies are that emerging economies have lower incomes and a lower
level of research capability. One can conjecture that if there is a convergence between the developed
and emerging economies in both of these dimensions, then there should be a convergence of their
IP laws as well, but in that case it is not clear if the convergence in IP laws is because of the
convergence of incomes or because of the convergence of research capabilities. However, the role of
each of these dimensions can be isolated if there is a convergence in only one of these dimensions. To
do so, we focus on the impact on IP laws if there is convergence in incomes without a commensurate
convergence in research capabilities.1 Therefore, in our framework, the main diﬀerence between an
emerging and a developed country is that the former has a domestic firm that engages in R&D,
1In general, the per capita income and research capabilities are correlated but there need not be a one-to-one
relationship between these two variables. Porter and Stern (2001) analyze the relationship between an "innovative
capacity index" and GDP per capita (in the year 2000) across countries and find evidence of a strong correlation.
However, they also find a lot of variation across countries. For example, it follows from Figure 5 of their article that
New Zealand and Israel had approximately the same GDP per capita in the year 2000 but Israel was substantially
ahead in terms of innovation capacity.
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while the latter has a domestic firm that only imitates a new technology, whenever possible. While
we agree that there are many points of diﬀerence between an emerging economy and a developed
economy, we focus on this diﬀerence since it seems to be the most relevant for the purpose of
analyzing the diﬀerent IP regimes that would emerge in equilibrium in either type of economy.2
Further, throughout the analysis, IP laws refer to the choice of patent length and breadth.
In the model, we analyze the solution to the following questions on the structure of IP laws:
(i) What is the relationship between the optimal patent length and the optimal patent breadth
in a country, given a fixed structure of IP laws in other countries? In other words, if a change in
circumstances necessitates an improvement in the degree of patent protection in a particular country
(given a fixed degree of IP protection abroad), how is this improvement achieved? (ii) What is the
relationship of the patent regimes across countries? In other words, if one country strengthens its
patent laws, should the other country’s best response be to weaken its patent laws? (iii) What is
the impact on the IP laws of an increase in the willingness-to-pay in the emerging economy?
Among these three questions, (i) has been studied most extensively in the literature. Patent
length and breadth both serve to increase the returns to R&D by introducing diﬀerent types of
distortions in the economy. In particular, the patent length represents the length of time during
which the consumers in an economy have to bear the distortionary eﬀects of a monopoly patentee,
while the patent breadth represents the excess burden consumers have to bear each period due to
such market distortions. Therefore, an economy selects the patent length and breadth that provides
a given return to R&D at the minimum possible social cost.
In the developed economy, the domestic firm expends eﬀort in R&D and the profit of this
firm is included in the social welfare function. Note that any incentives to this firm by way of
IP protection adversely impacts the consumers because of its distortionary eﬀects. Hence, in the
developed country, there is a tension between consumers and the domestic firms and the country
has to choose its IP laws (patent length and breadth) in a way that balances these conflicting
incentives. Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Klemperer (1990) and Gallini (1992) analyze the tradeoﬀ
between patent length and breadth in such economies for a given total reward. However, in these
papers, the R&D process has not been explicitly analyzed. DeBrock (1985) endogenizes R&D
but only considers patent lengths. However such models do not capture the incentive of emerging
2The model is completely general to allow for diﬀerent levels of willingness-to-pay of consumers or diﬀerent market
structures.
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economies to free ride on the IP laws of developed economies. To focus on such eﬀects, we assume
that the domestic firm in the emerging economy does not expend eﬀort in R&D but imitates the
innovation of the firm located in the developed economy. Therefore, the profit of the innovating firm
is not included in the social welfare function of the emerging economy and it might seem that the
emerging economy would select weak patent laws. However, in our model, if the emerging economy
selects excessively weak IP laws, it reduces the incentives of the firm in the developed economy
to expend eﬀort on R&D, and this in turn aﬀects welfare adversely in the emerging economy by
the lack of availability of new goods and services to consumers, and by the lack of opportunity
to imitate a new product by the domestic firm. Hence, the emerging economy selects its IP laws
that balance the interests of its domestic firm and consumers with the interest of the firm in the
developed economy.
In our analysis of (i), we find that the optimal patent length in either economy has a positive
relationship to its optimal patent breadth. Given the other economy’s IP laws, each economy has
to determine how much incremental protection to oﬀer the innovating firm (located in the developed
economy). Once the desired level of patent protection is determined, the economy achieves this by a
combination of suitable patent length and patent breadth. At the optimum solution, the elasticity of
the patent length has to equal the elasticity of the excess burden that the economy has to bear due
to a positive patent breadth. Further, since the excess burden is increasing in the patent breadth,
therefore the patent breadth and the patent length are positively related to each other.
Next, we analyze (ii), that is, the relationship of IP regimes across countries. How should a
country respond when a competing country improves its degree of patent protection? One would
expect that the country should respond by reducing its own degree of patent protection. This is
because each country has an incentive to reduce its own market distortions by free-riding on the
competitor’s IP laws. We show that this free-rider eﬀect is only part of the analysis and indeed
when R&D eﬀort is endogenized, there could be a countervailing eﬀect at work that could dampen
and even overturn the free-rider eﬀect. To see this, consider the degree of patent protection in each
country as an input in the production of R&D eﬀort. It can then be shown using Lemma 2 that
depending on the rate of change of the curvature of the R&D production function, the IP laws can
be substitutable inputs under certain circumstances (as expected), but more interestingly, can also
be complementary inputs under other circumstances. In the latter case (that is, for complementary
3
inputs), a decrease in one input reduces the marginal productivity of the other input. It therefore
follows that when the IP laws are complementary inputs, there is a cost associated with free-riding
on the competing country’s laws and this dampens the incentive to free-ride. Thus, when the IP
laws are strongly complementary inputs, the cost of free-riding is too high relative to its benefit and
it is possible for a country to strengthen its patent laws in response to an improvement of patent
laws in the competing country. The details of this argument is in Section 6.
What is the implication of the above finding? It is commonly observed that the degree of patent
protection is weaker in emerging countries than in developed countries. For example, it follows from
Table 3 of Park and Wagh (2002) that in the year 2000, the degree of patent protection of emerging
countries such as India, China or Brazil was considerably lower compared to the degree of patent
protection in the developed economies such as USA, UK or France. In this context, one might want
to know if the IP laws in the emerging countries would converge to the IP laws in the developed
countries as the emerging countries become richer. Our model shows that an increase in incomes in
emerging countries (without an increase in their research capabilities) is not suﬃcient to guarantee
convergence in both aspects of the IP laws. Some related papers such as Chen and Puttitanun
(2005), Lai and Qiu (2003), Grossman and Lai (2004) and Yang (1998) index the degree of patent
protection by a single parameter. However, patent protection is inherently multi-dimensional. Our
work builds on the literature and determines conditions under which the two main aspects of patent
protection (length and breadth) move in the same direction and conditions under which they move
in opposite directions.3 Wright (2005) considers both aspects of IP law in a two country setting
and is closest to this model. However, the focus of Wright (2005) is on the impact of the curvature
of the demand function on the IP laws of the developed as well as of the emerging economy. In
contrast, our focus is on the curvature of the R&D production function.
2 Model
It is assumed that there are two countries- 1 and 2. Country 1 is a prototype developed country
while country 2 is a prototype emerging country. The term "emerging economy" refers to any
country that has a market of reasonable size but is not yet as eﬃcient in R&D as a developed
3Note that the results in (i) have been derived under the assumption that the structure of IP laws in foreign
countries is fixed. In contrast, the analysis in (iii) allows the laws in foreign countries to vary as well.
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economy. An example of a developed economy would be USA and an example of an emerging
economy would be China or India. Each country i (i = 1, 2) has a firm that is denoted by i. These
assumptions are identical to the ones made in Zigic (1998) and are also similar to Kim and Lapan
(2008).4 A firm cares for its own profit and the country cares for the welfare which is the sum of
consumers’ surplus of its own citizens and the profit of the firm that is based in the country. These
assumptions need not be taken literally and have been taken for the sake of simplicity. In general,
"country 1" may represent the group of developed economies and "country 2" may represent the
group of emerging economies. Similarly, "firm i" may represent the relevant industry in country i.
In order to earn profits, firm 1 has to engage in R&D; throughout the analysis, we assume for
simplicity that firm 2 does not engage in R&D.5 These assumptions have also been made in Zigic
(1998) and Kim and Lapan (2008). Let R1 denote the eﬀort that firm 1 expends on R&D. The
outcome of R&D is uncertain in the model. If firm 1 expends an eﬀort of R1, then the probability
of success in R&D is denoted by P (R1). The function P (·) is the "production function" of R&D
and the nature of this function characterizes the R&D technology.6 It is assumed that if firm i does
not put in any eﬀort in R&D, its probability of success in R&D is 0, that is, P (0) = 0. We also
assume that the function P (·) satisfies the following restrictions:
P 0 (·) > 0 and P 00 (·) < 0.
Notice that P 0 (·) is the marginal productivity of R&D and P 00 (·) is the change in the marginal
productivity of R&D due to small changes in R1.
Suppose the flow of profits to a firm at each instant is π, the patent length is Ti in country i, and
the discount rate is normalized to 1. Therefore, the present discounted value of the future profits
from the innovation are Z Ti
0
πe−tdt = π
¡
1− e−Ti
¢
.
Notice that because
¡
1− e−Ti
¢
and Ti are monotonically related, therefore, we can measure the
patent length in country i by
λi ≡ 1− e−Ti.
4In Kim and Lapan (2008), there are multiple emerging economies instead of one as is assumed in our model.
5What really matters for the results is that firm 1 has a suﬃciently higher likelihood of being successful in R&D
with the same eﬀort.
6Scotchmer ((2004a), p. 54) lists certain well-known papers on the production function approach to R&D.
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It follows from the definition that λi ∈ [0, 1); i = 1, 2. This notion of patent length is the same
as the notion of "discounted time" that is sometimes used in the literature (Scotchmer (2004a), p.
59).7
The definition of patent breadth is more problematic as there does not seem to be any unanimity
in the literature about either its definition or measurement. In this model, the patent breadth
is defined to be the fraction of the technology improvement that does not spill out to the non-
innovating firm. Hence, the patent breadth in country i is measured by βi ≡ (1− αi) where
αi measures the degree of knowledge spillover from the invented product to the imitated product;
αi ∈ [0, 1]. A value of αi = 0means that in country i, the imitator cannot use any of the incremental
knowledge embodied in the invention and hence is equivalent to the maximum possible patent
breadth. Conversely, a value of αi = 1 means that in country i, the imitator can use all of the
incremental knowledge embodied in the invention and hence is equivalent to the minimum possible
patent breadth. This definition of patent breadth has been used in Denicolò ((1996), p. 252) and
is similar to Klemperer (1990). Further, the degree of spillovers has also been used as a measure of
IP protection in Zigic (1998) and Kim and Lapan (2008). Other definitions of patent breadth have
been used in the literature. For example, in Gallini (1992), an imitator pays a fixed cost to imitate a
new technology and this fixed cost is defined to be the patent breadth. Notice that Gallini’s notion
of patent breadth is diﬀerent from the one used in this model.
A successful invention can be patented costlessly in both countries. Further, given knowledge
spillovers, a non-patented technology can be imitated perfectly. Hence, firm 1 always patents the
innovation in both countries. Moreover, we also assume national treatment of IP laws, that is, in
each country, the IP laws treat the domestic firm and the foreign firm equally. Below, we determine
the patent length λi and patent breadth (1− αi) for country i (i = 1, 2) endogenously. In the
following examples, we illustrate the notion of patent breadth used in the analysis.
Example 1 Suppose in an industry, there is a publicly available technology that allows a firm to
produce at a marginal cost of μ. There are two firms in the industry. Firm 1 invents a cost-reducing
technology that allows it to produce at a marginal cost of μ−θ. Therefore, the incremental knowledge
embodied in firm 1’s technology is θ. If the patent breadth in country i is βi ≡ (1− αi), firm 2 can
7If we had assumed the discount rate to be r instead, then λi could take any value between 0 and 1r . We structure
the discussion using r = 1 for simplicity.
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reduce its marginal cost by αiθ by imitating the technology. Hence, firm 2 can achieve a marginal
cost of μ− αiθ. ¥
Example 2 Consider a vertically diﬀerentiated industry as described in Tirole ((1988), p. 96 and
pp. 296-298). There are two firms in the industry. Each consumer purchases at most one unit of
the good. There is a publicly available technology that allows a firm to produce at a quality level
of 0. Assume that firm 1 develops a technology that improves the quality of its product to θ > 0.
Therefore, the incremental knowledge embodied in firm 1’s technology is θ. With a patent breadth
of βi ≡ (1− αi), the maximum quality of the imitated product that firm 2 can produce is αiθ in
country i (i = 1, 2). ¥
Because patent breadth and knowledge spillover have a one-to-one relationship, it is suﬃcient
to determine just one of these variables. Following Denicolò (1996), we focus on the degree of
knowledge spillover αi, in addition to the patent length.
The instantaneous profit of firm i in country j conditional on a successful innovation is
πij (αj) ; i, j = 1, 2.
A higher degree of knowledge spillover results in a reduction in firm 1’s profit and this is captured
formally as follows:
π01j (αj) < 0. (1)
We do not impose any restriction on the sign of π02j (αj). The net payoﬀ of firm 1 with an R&D
eﬀort of R1 is
Π1 = P (R1)V1 −R1, (2)
where
V1 = λ1π11 (α1) + (1− λ1)π11 (1) + λ2π12 (α2) + (1− λ2)π12 (1) (3)
is the gross profit of firm 1 conditional on a successful invention. Note that during the duration of
the patent in country 1, the patent breadth is (1− α1) and the corresponding flow rate of profit
for firm 1 is π11 (α1). Hence, the gross payoﬀ of firm 1 in country 1 during the duration of the
patent is λ1π11 (α1). After the expiry of the patent, the patent breadth in country 1 decreases to 0
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and and the corresponding flow rate of profit for firm 1 decreases to π11 (1). Therefore, the gross
payoﬀ of firm 1 in country 1 after the expiry of the patent is (1− λ1)π11 (1). Similarly, the gross
payoﬀ of firm 1 in country 2 is λ2π12 (α2) for the duration of the patent and (1− λ2)π12 (1) after its
expiry. In case the R&D eﬀort fails, the gross payoﬀ of everyone (that is both firms and countries)
is normalized to 0.8
For the discussion below, notice that V1 can be re-written in the following form:
V1 = π11 (1) + π12 (1)− λ1
Z 1
α1
π011 (z) dz − λ2
Z 1
α2
π012 (z) dz. (4)
Analogously, the net payoﬀ of firm 2 is
Π2 = P (R1)V2 (5)
where
V2 = λ1π21 (α1) + (1− λ1)π21 (1) + λ2π22 (α2) + (1− λ2)π22 (1)
= π21 (1) + π22 (1)− λ1
Z 1
α1
π021 (z) dz − λ2
Z 1
α2
π022 (z) dz (6)
In the above expression, V2 is the gross profit of firm 2 conditional on a successful invention.
Notice that the gross payoﬀ of firm 2 in country 1 is λ1π21 (α1) for the duration of the patent and
(1− λ2)π12 (1) after its expiry. Similarly, gross payoﬀ of firm 2 in country 2 is λ2π22 (α2) for the
duration of the patent and (1− λ2)π22 (1) after its expiry.
It is assumed that the consumer surplus in both countries is 0 in the event that R&D is unsuc-
cessful. Let ci (αi) be the instantaneous consumer surplus in country i conditional on a successful
invention, when the degree of knowledge spillover is αi. We assume that the instantaneous consumer
surplus is increasing in the degree of knowledge spillover αi, that is,
c0i (αi) > 0. (7)
8Observe that we make no assumption about the value of πij (1). In the presence of a competitive fringe, πij (1)
could be assumed to be 0, but we do not make any such assumption since the competitive fringe does not play any
role in our model.
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Then the total consumer surplus in country 1, conditional on a successful invention, is given by
C1 = λ1c1 (α1) + (1− λ1) c1 (1)
= c1 (1)− λ1
Z 1
α1
c01 (z) dz (8)
and in country 2 is given by
C2 = λ2c2 (α2) + (1− λ2) c2 (1)
= c2 (1)− λ2
Z 1
α2
c02 (z) dz. (9)
Below, we demonstrate examples in which the reduced form assumptions on the profit and consumer
surplus functions are satisfied.
Example 3 Consider Example 1. Further, assume that the inverse demand function is given by
p = a− q1 − q2.
Then, conditional on a successful innovation, the instantaneous profits of firms 1 and 2 are
π1i (αi) =
µ
a− μ+ (2− αi) θ
3
¶2
and π2i (αi) =
µ
a− μ− (1− 2αi) θ
3
¶2
respectively. Moreover, conditional on a successful innovation, the instantaneous consumer surplus
is given by
c (αi) =
1
18
©
4a2 − (2μ− (1 + αi) θ)2
ª
.
Notice that,
π01i (αi) < 0, π
0
2i (αi) > 0 and c
0 (αi) > 0.
Hence, (1) and (7) are satisfied in the context of this example. ¥
Example 4 Consider Example 2. Further, assume that both firms have a constant marginal cost
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of γ. The preference of a consumer is given by
U =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
θjv − p if he purchases a good of quality θj,
0 otherwise.
In this formulation, U can be thought of as the consumer’s surplus. The "taste for quality" parameter
v is uniformly distributed between [v, v] where v = v+1. The quality of firm 1’s product is θ and the
quality of firm 2’s product is αiθ. Then, conditional on a successful innovation, the instantaneous
profits of firms 1 and 2 are
π1i (αi) =
µ
1 + v
3
¶2
(1− αi) θ and π2i (αi) =
µ
1− v
3
¶2
(1− αi) θ
respectively. Further, conditional on a successful innovation, the instantaneous consumer surplus is
given by
c (αi) =
1
2
θ (v − vˆ)2 + 1
2
αiθ (vˆ − v)2 − π1i (αi)− π2i (αi)− γ,
where
vˆ =
v + v
3
.
Notice that,
π01i (αi) < 0, π
0
2i (αi) < 0 and c
0 (αi) > 0.
Hence, (1) and (7) are satisfied in the context of this example. ¥
Observe that the sign of π02i (αi) is diﬀerent in the two examples. However, we have made no
assumption about the sign of π02i (αi) and hence, the assumptions of the model are not violated in
these examples. Below, we use the consumer surplus and the profit of the domestic firm to define
the welfare of each country. To do so, we define the expected consumer surplus in country i by
Si = P (R1)Ci; i = 1, 2.
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The welfare Wi of country i is defined to be
Wi =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
P (R1) (C1 + V1)−R1 for i = 1,
P (R1) (C2 + V2) for i = 2.
; (10)
To analyze the welfare function, first consider country 1. In the event of a successful R&D, the
consumers in country 1 enjoy a surplus of C1 and firm 1 obtains a gross profit of V1, while in the
event of a failure in R&D, the consumers in country 1 as well as firm 1 get a payoﬀ of 0. Hence,
the expected gross payoﬀ that accrues to country 1 is P (R1) (C1 + V1). The net payoﬀ of country
1 can be then be determined by subtracting the cost of the R&D eﬀort R1. Next consider country
2. We assume that firm 2 can imitate firm 1’s innovation with certainty by incurring a fixed cost.
Such an assumption has been made in some other papers in the literature such as Mukherjee and
Pennings (2004). In our framework, the fixed cost of imitation does not play an important role and
has been normalized to 0. Hence, the welfare function of country 2 is as given in (10). Notice that
country 2 has a stake in the success of R&D since otherwise, the ex post payoﬀ of country 2 is 0
instead of (C2 + V2).
In the model, country i maximizes Wi by selecting the patent length λi and the patent breadth
(1− αi); i = 1, 2. In country 1, there is a tension between consumers in country 1 (who prefer a
shorter patent length) and firm 1 (the innovating firm). The optimal patent length in country 1
therefore balances the tension between the consumers and firm 1. In country 2, the benefits from
a strong patent regime does not accrue directly to its citizens and therefore it might seem that
country 2 would free-ride on country 1’s innovation by selecting excessively weak patent laws. This
is however not true in this model because country 2 recognizes that excessively weak patent laws
might reduce the incentive of firm 1 to conduct R&D and this in turn adversely aﬀects country
2’s welfare. The incentive of each country to provide patent protection is aptly summarized in the
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following quote by Scotchmer ((2004b), p. 415):
"To a trade policy negotiator, profit earned abroad is unambiguously a good thing,
and the consumers’ surplus conferred on foreign consumers does not count at all.
There is a domestic interest in capturing profit abroad, and symmetrically, there is
a domestic interest in trying to ensure that domestic consumers get access to foreign
inventions on competitive terms."
The timeline is similar to Kim and Lapan (2008) and is as follows: In period 1, the two countries
simultaneously select their IP laws. Then in period 2, firm 1 determines its R&D eﬀort. Finally, the
outcomes of the R&D are known and firms make profits. In the following sections, we determine
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game described above.
3 R&D Eﬀort of Firm 1
In period 2, firm 1 selects its R&D eﬀort that maximizes its net expected profit Π1. It therefore
follows from (2) that the profit maximizing R&D eﬀort, denoted by R∗1, satisfies the following
equation:
P 0 (R∗1) =
1
V1
. (11)
We define the marginal product of R&D as the increase in the probability of success in R&D due to
a small change in the eﬀort R1. Hence, the marginal product in R&D is measured by P 0 (R1). From
(11), it follows that at the optimum level of R&D for firm 1, the value of the marginal product of
R&D, given by V1P 0 (R∗1), is equal to 1, which is the marginal cost of R&D. Also notice that R∗1 is
a function of the patent length and the patent breadth of both countries, that is,
R∗1 = R
∗
1 (λ1, α1, λ2, α2) .
In our analysis, the rate of change of the marginal product in R&D plays a crucial role and is
12
1R 1R δ+
( )1P •
( )2P •
R&D Effort
Probability 
of 
Success
Figure 1: The relationship between curvature and chance of failure. A higher degree of curvature
leaves firm 1 exposed to a higher chance of failure in R&D with the same additional eﬀort.
denoted by σ (R1) where σ (R1) is as follows:
σ (R1) = −
d
dR1
lnP 0 (R1) = −
P 00 (R1)
P 0 (R1)
.
Notice that σ (·) is positively related to the curvature of the R&D production function P (·), that
is, an increase in the curvature of P (·) leads to an increase in σ (·). The implication is that an
increase in R1 will increase P (·) by a smaller amount, the higher is the curvature of the function
P (·). For concreteness, we refer to Figure 1 in which we compare two functions P 1 (·) and P 2 (·)
such that P 1 (·) is more curved than P 2 (·). Further suppose that at the initial value of R1, these
two functions intersect, that is,
P 1 (R1) = P 2 (R1) .
Then, it must be the case that for a small increase in R1, say δR1 > 0, the following inequality
must be satisfied:
P 1 (R1 + δR1) < P 2 (R1 + δR1) .
Therefore, a higher curvature of the function P (·) implies a smaller chance of success in R&D
with the same additional eﬀort. Below, we show that it is possible for the curvature of the
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R&D production function to decrease "rapidly" with R1 under certain circumstances, and for the
curvature to either increase or decrease slowly under diﬀerent circumstances.
Example 5 Suppose the probability of success P (R1) in R&D is given by the distribution function
of the exponential distribution with parameter μ > 0. Therefore,
P (R1) = 1− e−μR1; μ > 0,
and it follows that
σ (R1) = μ
and hence,
σ0 (R1) = 0.
For later reference, also note that
σ2 (R1) + σ0 (R1) = μ2 > 0.
Example 6 Suppose the probability of success P (R1) in R&D is given by the distribution function
of the beta distribution with parameters (μ, 1); 0 < μ < 1. Therefore,
P (R1) = R
μ
1 ; 0 < μ < 1 & R1 ∈ [0, 1] ,
and it follows that
σ (R1) =
1− μ
R1
.
For later reference, also note that
σ2 (R1) + σ0 (R1) = −
(1− μ)μ
R21
< 0.
It will be shown below that one of the important determinants of the intellectual property law
in a country is the manner in which the rate of change of the marginal product in R&D changes
due to a change in the eﬀort. Using (11) and the implicit function theorem, we derive the following
lemma.
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Lemma 1 At the optimum level of R&D eﬀort,
∂R∗1
∂λ1
= −P
0 (R∗1)
σ (R∗1)
Z 1
α1
π011 (z) dz > 0, (12)
∂R∗1
∂λ2
= −P
0 (R∗1)
σ (R∗1)
Z 1
α2
π012 (z) dz > 0, (13)
∂R∗1
∂α1
=
P 0 (R∗1)
σ (R∗1)
λ1π011 (α1) < 0 (14)
and
∂R∗1
∂α2
=
P 0 (R∗1)
σ (R∗1)
λ2π012 (α2) < 0. (15)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Below, we interpret (12). Notice that
∂V1
∂λ1
=
Z 1
α1
π011 (z) dz
measures the change in the payoﬀ of firm 1 due to a change in λ1. Such a change in payoﬀ induces
firm 1 to expend more eﬀort in R&Dwhich changes both the marginal product in R&D (as measured
by P 0 (R∗1)) as well as the rate of change of the marginal product in R&D (as measured by σ (R∗1)).
Therefore,
P 0 (R∗1)
σ (R∗1)
measures the ratio of the marginal product to the rate of change of the marginal product in R&D.
Hence, it follows from (12) that in equilibrium, the impact on the R&D eﬀort of firm 1 of a change in
λ1 depends on the change in V1 and the ratio of the marginal product in R&D to its rate of change.
Similar logic applies for (13), (14) and (15). Further, the above inequalities state that other things
remaining constant, the R&D eﬀort of firm 1 increases in the patent lengths and patent breadths
of the two countries. Therefore, stronger patent protection in either country results in an increase
in the optimum eﬀort of firm 1. However, the eﬀectiveness of the IP protection in inducing R&D
eﬀort depends on the IP laws in the other country, and we show in the following lemma, that the
nature of this relationship is characterized by the value of σ0 (R1).
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Lemma 2 At the optimum level of R&D eﬀort,
sign
µ
∂2R∗1
∂λ1∂λ2
¶
= −sign
¡
σ2 (R∗1) + σ
0 (R∗1)
¢
. (16)
sign
µ
∂2R∗1
∂λi∂αj
¶
= sign
¡
σ2 (R∗1) + σ
0 (R∗1)
¢
; i 6= j. (17)
Further,
σ2 (R∗1) + σ
0 (R∗1) < 0⇒
∂2R∗1
∂λi∂αi
< 0 and
∂2R∗1
∂λi∂αi
> 0⇒ σ2 (R∗1) + σ0 (R∗1) > 0; i = 1, 2. (18)
Proof. See the Appendix.
It follows from (16) that the value of σ0 (R1) is a crucial determinant of the eﬀectiveness of a
country’s IP laws on the optimum amount of R&D eﬀort. In particular, if the rate of change of
marginal product in R&D decreases rapidly, that is, if
σ0 (R∗1) < −σ2 (R∗1) ,
then the patent lengths are complementary inputs in the "production" of the invention, while if the
rate of change of marginal product in R&D either increases or decreases slowly, that is, if
σ0 (R∗1) > −σ2 (R∗1) ,
then the patent lengths are substitutable inputs. Hence, it follows from Example 6 that if P (R1) is
the distribution function of Beta (μ, 1), then the patent lengths are complementary inputs, while it
follows from Example 5 that if P (R1) is the distribution function of the exponential distribution,
then the patent lengths are substitutable inputs. In the next section, we analyze country 2’s problem
and determine its choice of IP laws.
4 IP Law in Country 2 (Emerging Country)
We now analyze the factors that determine country 2’s IP laws where country 2 refers to the
emerging economy. In our analysis, we allow country 2 to select both its patent length λ2 and its
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patent breadth (1− α2). Therefore, country 2 solves the following problem:
Max| {z } W2 = P (R∗1) (C2 + V2) ,
λ2, α2
(19)
where W2 refers to country 2’s welfare. For the discussion below, we define
φi (αi) = ci (αi) + πii (αi) ; i = 1, 2,
as the sum of the instantaneous consumer surplus in country i and the profit of firm i from country
i, as a function of the patent breadth. The expression φi (αi) is the part of the consumer surplus
and producer surplus generated in country i that accrues to country i when the degree of knowledge
spillover is αi. The total welfare of country i derives from φi (αi) and the producer surplus of firm
i in country j but the latter has no direct impact on the IP laws in country i because it is not
within the control of the government of country i.9 The sign of φ02 (·) depends on c02 (α2) as well
as on π022 (α2). Under the assumptions of the model, c02 (α2) is positive but the sign of π022 (α2) is
ambiguous and hence, the sign of φ02 (·) is also ambiguous. Notice that φ02 (·) > 0 in the case of
the cost reducing innovation (described is Example 3) as well as the case of the quality enhancing
innovation (described in Example 4). Hence, we assume that
φ02 (·) > 0.
An implication of the above assumption is that the optimal patent lengths and the optimal patent
breadth of the emerging economy have an interior solution. If, on the other hand, we had assumed
that φ02 (·) < 0, then, it would follow from (21) below that the welfare of country 2 would have been
maximized for α2 = 0, that is, the emerging economy would have selected the maximum possible
patent breadth. Notice that the term Z 1
α2
φ02 (z) dz
captures the loss of welfare to country 2 because the government in country 2 selects the degree
of knowledge spillover as α2 instead of 1. This excess burden emanates because a change in the
9The producer surplus of firm i in country j is internalized by a global planner but a global planner is not the
focus of this section.
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degree of knowledge spillover changes consumers’ surplus and producers’ surplus in country 2 and
also because it changes the distribution of the producers’ surplus between the domestic and the
foreign firm. In the subsequent discussion, we call this the instantaneous excess burden in country
2.
From the definition of W2, it follows that:
∂W2
∂λ2
= P 0 (R∗1) (C2 + V2)
∂R∗1
∂λ2
− P (R∗1)
Z 1
α2
φ02 (z) dz (20)
and
∂W2
∂α2
= P 0 (R∗1) (C2 + V2)
∂R∗1
∂α2
+ P (R∗1)λ2φ
0
2 (α2) (21)
In (20) above, the first term on the right hand side is the indirect eﬀect of increasing the patent
length while the second term measures the direct eﬀect of increasing the patent length. The two
eﬀects capture the two channels through which an increase in patent length aﬀects welfare. If there
is an increase in the patent length in country 2, then other things remaining constant, consumers
and firm 2 are adversely aﬀected because they have to bear the excess burden for a longer duration
and this eﬀect is captured by the direct eﬀect. However, when there is an increase in the patent
length in country 2, then other things remaining constant, firm 1 expends a higher degree of eﬀort
in R&D and this benefits consumers in country 2 and firm 2 by increasing the chance of a successful
invention. This second eﬀect is captured by the indirect eﬀect. The two terms in (21) have an
analogous interpretation.
At the optimum, the country 2 selects λ2 and α2 to satisfy the following conditions:
∂W2
∂λ2
= 0, (22)
∂W2
∂α2
= 0. (23)
We now use (22) and (23) to determine the relationship between the optimal λ2 and the optimal
α2, given a fixed structure of laws in country 1 (the developed economy). To do so, notice that by
dividing the two first order conditions, we obtain that
λ02 (α2)
λ2 (α2)
= − φ
0
2 (α2)R 1
α2
φ02 (z) dz
(24)
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Figure 2: The locus of the points of tangencies between the iso-welfare curves of country 2 and
iso-payoﬀ curves of firm 1.
and hence,
d lnλ2 (α2) = d ln
µZ 1
α2
φ02 (z) dz
¶
. (25)
Notice from (25) that at the optimum choice of patent length and breadth for country 2, the
elasticity of the patent length is equal to the elasticity of the instantaneous excess burden. Since the
instantaneous excess burden in country 2 is an increasing function of the patent breadth (1− α2),
therefore, the optimal patent length is positively related to the optimal patent breadth, given a
fixed structure of IP laws abroad (country 1). This implies that when a situation warrants that
country 2 select a strong (resp., weak) degree of patent protection, country 2 achieves this partly
by a long (resp., short) patent length and partly by a broad (resp., narrow) patent breadth. Hence,
the "expansion path" of IP laws (depicted by the curve AB in Figure 2) is positively sloped.
In the figure, the iso-payoﬀ curves of firm 1 and the iso-welfare curves of country 2 have been
drawn as a function of the patent length and the patent breadth. The iso-payoﬀ curves increase
and the iso-welfare curves decrease with an increase in the patent length and the patent breadth.
Conditional on a fixed payoﬀ to firm 1, country 2 can maximize its welfare by selecting the patent
length and breadth at the point of tangency of the iso-welfare curve and the iso-payoﬀ curve. From
(25), we can conclude that the locus of the points of tangencies is positively sloped.
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We can also derive the following functional relationship between the optimal values of λ2 and
α2.
Proposition 1 Fix λ1 and α1. The ratio of the patent length and the instantaneous excess burden
of country 2 is a constant and is equal to the ratio of the patent length and the instantaneous excess
burden when the patent breadth is set at the maximum possible level. In other words,
λ2 (α2)R 1
α2
φ02 (z) dz
=
λ2 (0)R 1
0
φ02 (z) dz
. (26)
In the above expression, the ratio on the right hand side depends on the IP law of country 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
It follows from (26) that any change in the degree of protection in country 1 leads to a change
in λ2 (0) and consequently, for every level of α2, there is a proportionate change in λ2 (α2). Further,
λ2 (1) = 0 and hence, a change in the degree of protection in country 1 pivots the schedule relating
the optimal patent length and the optimal patent breadth in country 2 around the origin. What
will be the direction of such a pivot if there is an increase in the level of IP protection in country 1?
A natural conjecture is that if country 1 increases its degree of IP protection, then it would induce
country 2 to free ride on country 1’s laws by weakening its patent laws (in which case the schedule
AB in Figure 3 would pivot downwards). However, in this model, an additional eﬀect occurs which
can pivot the schedule AB upwards under certain circumstances.
To see this, let country 1 increase λ1. In response, country 2 would like to free ride on country
1’s improved patent protection by decreasing its patent length. We call this the free-rider eﬀect.
If the R&D eﬀort had been exogenous, then the free rider eﬀect would have been the only eﬀect
and hence, in such a model, country 2 would have unambiguously reduced its patent length in
response to an increase in country 1’s patent length. But in our model, R&D eﬀort is endogenous
and as a result there is a second eﬀect known as the productivity eﬀect. We show below that under
certain circumstances, the productivity eﬀect may reinforce the free-rider eﬀect and under other
circumstances, it may weaken the free-rider eﬀect. To examine the role of the productivity eﬀect,
imagine that the IP laws are inputs in the production of R&D eﬀort. Now consider a situation in
which country 1 increases its degree of patent protection and country 2 reduces λ2 in response.
First, consider the familiar case of ∂
2R∗1
∂λ1∂λ2
< 0, that is, suppose that the patent lengths are
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Figure 3: The schedule AB relates the optimal patent length in country 2 with its optimal patent
breadth, given a fixed patent length in country 1. An increase in the patent length in country
1 pivots the schedule downwards (resp., upwards) if the patent lengths are substitutable (resp.,
strongly complementary) inputs.
substitutable inputs in the production of R&D. In this case, when country 2 reduces λ2, then
the marginal productivity of λ1 increases (that is,
∂R∗1
∂λ1
increases) and hence, the eﬀectiveness of
country 1’s law is strengthened. Observe that if the patent lengths are substitutable inputs, then
the productivity eﬀect reinforces the free rider eﬀect and thus increases the incentive of country 2 to
reduce its level of patent protection. Consequently, the schedule AB in Figure 3 pivots downwards.
Therefore, when the patent lengths are substitutable inputs, then the optimal λ2 is a decreasing
function of λ1. Next, consider the case in which patents are complementary inputs, that is,
∂2R∗1
∂λ1∂λ2
>
0. In this case, a reduction in λ2 leads to a reduction in the marginal productivity of λ1 (that is,
∂R∗1
∂λ1
goes down) and this weakens the eﬀectiveness of country 1’s laws. In this case, the productivity
eﬀect imposes a cost associated with a reduction in λ2 and therefore dampens country 2’s incentive
to reduce λ2. If the patent laws are strong complements, then the productivity eﬀect can overturn
the free rider eﬀect and hence in this case, country 2 cannot free ride on country 1’s improved
patent protection. Consequently there is an upward pivot of the schedule relating patent length
and breadth in country 2. This argument is presented formally in Proposition 2 below.10
Given that λ2 and α2 are strictly monotonically related, we can re-write country 2’s maximization
10Note that in terms of Figure 2, an increase in the degree of patent protection in country 1 changes the R&D
eﬀort which can result in the iso-welfare curves becoming flatter in some cases and steeper in others. This is what
causes the curve AB to sometimes pivot upwards (and sometimes downwards) in response to stronger IP protection
in country 1.
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as follows:
Max| {z } W2 (λ2, α2 (λ2)) .
λ2
The slope of the reduced form welfare function of country 2 is as follows:
dW2
dλ2
=
∂W2
∂λ2
+
∂W2
∂α2
α02 (λ2)
and using (22), (23) and (24), we obtain the following:
dW2
dλ2
= P 0 (R∗1) (C2 + V2)
∙
∂R∗1
∂λ2
+ α02 (λ2)
∂R∗1
∂α2
¸
− 2P (R∗1)
Z 1
α2
φ02 (z) dz. (27)
At the optimum, country 2 selects λ2 such that
dW2
dλ2
= 0. (28)
The solution of the above equation is denoted by λˆ2 (λ1) and is known as the reaction function of
country 2 as a function of λ1. The reaction function of country 2 captures the total impact on the
optimal λ2 due to a change in λ1, where the total impact includes the direct impact on λ2 because
of the change in λ1 and an indirect impact on λ2 because of a change in α2. We now determine
the slope of λˆ2 (λ1) and show that the rate of change of the marginal product in R&D is a crucial
determinant of whether the reaction functions are downward or upward sloping, that is, whether
patent lengths are strategic substitutes or strategic complements (Bulow et al., 1985).
Proposition 2 (i) If π021 (α1) > 0 and σ0 (R∗1) > −σ2 (R∗1) are satisfied, then λˆ
0
2 (λ1) < 0. (ii) If
λˆ
0
2 (λ1) > 0, then either π021 (α1) < 0 or σ0 (R∗1) < −σ2 (R∗1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The first part of the proposition above states that the reaction function of country 2 is downward
sloping if two conditions are satisfied: (a) The rate of change of the marginal product in R&D
(measured by the curvature of the production function) does not decrease very rapidly with an
increase in the R&D eﬀort, and (b) the profit of firm 2 is an increasing function of the degree of
knowledge spillover (or a decreasing function of the patent breadth) in country 1. If (a) holds, then
Lemma 2 implies that the patent lengths are substitutable inputs and hence, it follows from the
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discussion above that λ2 decreases in response to an increase in λ1. If (b) holds, then firm 2’s flow
of profits in a country is a decreasing function of its patent breadth. This condition is satisfied
for a cost-reducing technology as described in Example 3. Notice that if country 1 increases its
patent length, then this reduces the net payoﬀ earned by firm 2 in country 1.11 Country 2 then
compensates for this loss by reducing its own patent length.
The second part of the proposition states the necessary conditions under which the reaction
function of country 2 is upward sloping. In particular, if the reaction function of country 2 is
upward sloping, then either (c) the rate of change of the marginal product in R&D (measured by
the curvature of the production function) must decrease very rapidly with an increase in R&D
eﬀort, or (d) the profit of firm 2 is an increasing function of the patent breadth in country 1. If
(c) is satisfied, then the patent lengths are complementary inputs and the result follows from the
discussion above. If (d) is satisfied, then the profit of firm 2 is an increasing function of the patent
breadth of country 1. This condition is satisfied for a quality enhancing technology (as described
in Example 4).
5 IP Law in Country 1 (Developed Country)
In this section, we analyze the factors that determine the IP regime in country 1. In period 1,
country 1 maximizes its welfare by determining its patent length λ1 and its patent breadth (1− α1).
Formally, country 1 solves the following problem:
Max| {z } W1 = P (R∗1) (C1 + V1)−R∗1.
λ1, α1
The instantaneous surplus accruing to the consumers of country 1 and firm 1 from country 1 is
defined by
φ1 (α1) = c1 (α1) + π11 (α1) .
11The gross payoﬀ of firm 2 in country 1 is
λ1π21 (α1) + (1− λ1)π21 (1)
which is decreasing in λ1 whenever
π21 (α1) < π21 (1) .
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Notice that φ1 (α1) is the portion of the welfare of country 1 that originates from country 1. Anal-
ogous to the excess burden of country 2, we define the instantaneous excess burden in country 1 by
the term Z 1
α1
φ01 (z) dz.
From the definition of W1, it follows that:
∂W1
∂λ1
= [P 0 (R∗1) (C1 + V1)− 1]
∂R∗1
∂λ1
− P (R∗1)
Z 1
α1
φ01 (z) dz (29)
and using (11), we can re-write (29) as follows:
∂W1
∂λ1
= P 0 (R∗1)C1
∂R∗1
∂λ1
− P (R∗1)
Z 1
α1
φ01 (z) dz. (30)
In the above expression, the term P (R∗1)
R 1
α1
φ01 (z) dz measures the direct eﬀect of changing the
patent length on the welfare of country 1, while P 0 (R∗1)C1
∂R∗1
∂λ1
measures the indirect eﬀect of chang-
ing the patent length by its impact on R&D eﬀort. The direct eﬀect measures the impact of a
change in the patent length in country 1 on the excess burden in country 1, while the indirect eﬀect
measures the impact on welfare of a change in the patent length due to its eﬀect on the level of
R&D eﬀort. Analogous to (30), we also determine that
∂W1
∂α1
= P 0 (R∗1)C1
∂R∗1
∂α1
+ P (R∗1)λ1φ
0
1 (α1) . (31)
Notice that if φ01 (α1) < 0, then
∂W1
∂λ1
> 0 for all λ1,
and
∂W1
∂α1
< 0 for all α1.
In such a case, the optimal λ1 would have been 1 and the optimal α1 would have been 0, that is,
country 1 would have chosen the maximum possible level of IP protection. In order to avoid such
corner solutions, henceforth, we assume that
φ01 (·) > 0. (32)
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This assumption is satisfied for a quality-enhancing technology (as described in Example 4) but
not for a cost-reducing technology (as described in Example 3). In the next section, we discuss
the impact on the results of a violation of this assumption. Given the above assumption, at the
optimum, country 1 selects its patent length λ1 such that
∂W1
∂λ1
= 0, (33)
and
∂W1
∂α1
= 0. (34)
Before proceeding, we discuss the impact of introducing endogeneity of R&D eﬀort in the model.
This will also allow us to compare the results of this model with the ones obtained in previous work,
such as Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990). If R&D had been exogenous, then the
first term in the right hand side of (31) would have dropped out. Hence, with exogenous R&D
eﬀort,
sign
µ
∂W1
∂α1
¶
= sign (φ01 (α1)) .
Therefore, if φ01 (α1) > 0 for all α1, then the optimal value of α1 = 1, that is, narrow patents would
be optimal. This result is similar to Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and to some extent, to Klemperer
(1990) also. However, with endogenous R&D, the term P 0 (R∗1)C1
∂R∗1
∂α1
is included in (31) and since
this term is negative, therefore, it tends to reduce the optimal value of α1. Consequently, endo-
geneity of R&D tends to increase the optimal patent breadth under the assumption that φ01 (α1) > 0
for all α1. In contrast, if φ01 (α1) < 0 for all α1, then broad patents are optimal both when R&D
eﬀort is exogenous and when it is endogenous. It also follows from (20) and (21) that if R&D eﬀort
is exogenous and if φ02 (α2) > 0 for all α2, then the emerging economy selects α2 = 1 and λ2 = 0 .
Consequently, the emerging economy does not provide any IP protection under these conditions.
Denicolò (1996) considers a model in which the government selects the patent length and breadth
to induce a target level of R&D eﬀort. His focus is on finding suﬃcient conditions under which the
optimal patent breadth is at an extremity. Naturally, this paper does not discuss the impact on the
IP laws of a change in the target level of R&D eﬀort. After all, if the patent breadth is already at an
extremity, then an increase in the target level cannot have any impact on the patent breadth and the
adjustment is made entirely through a change in the patent length. Our purpose is to analyze the
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impact of a change in the IP law of one country on the IP laws in another country. In this setting,
the incremental level of inducement in R&D that a country oﬀers depends on the inducement oﬀered
by the other country. Because this exercise is more interesting for interior solutions, therefore, we
focus on the interior solution.
We now use (33) and (34) to determine the relationship between λ1 and α1 when R&D eﬀort is
assumed to be endogenous. To do so, notice that by dividing these two equations, it follows that
λ01 (α1)
λ1 (α1)
= − φ
0
1 (α1)R 1
α1
φ01 (z) dz
< 0 (35)
from which we obtain the following:
d lnλ1 (α1) = d ln
µZ 1
α1
φ01 (z) dz
¶
. (36)
It follows from (36) that if (32) is satisfied, then the developed economy also selects its patent length
and patent breadth such that the elasticity of the patent length is equal to the elasticity of the excess
burden. Since the excess burden is positively related to the patent breadth, therefore, the model
predicts that the optimal patent length in country 1 is positively related to the optimal patent
breadth even for the developed economy. In the following proposition, we derive the functional
relationship between the optimal patent length and the optimal patent breadth of country 1, given
a fixed structure of IP laws in country 2.
Proposition 3 Suppose φ01 (α1) > 0 for all α1. Then, for fixed λ2 and α2, the ratio of the patent
length and the instantaneous excess burden of country 1 is a constant that is equal to the ratio of the
patent length and the instantaneous excess burden when the patent breadth is set at the maximum
possible level. In other words,
λ1 (α1)R 1
α1
φ01 (z) dz
=
λ1 (0)R 1
0
φ01 (z) dz
. (37)
In the above expression, the ratio on the right hand side depends on the IP law of country 2.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.
The above proposition implies that even for developed economies, the optimal patent length is
an increasing function of the optimal patent breadth when φ01 (α1) > 0, given a fixed structure of IP
laws in country 2. Given that λ1 and α1 are strictly monotonically related, we can re-write country
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1’s maximization as follows:
Max| {z } W1 (λ1, α1 (λ1)) .
λ1
The slope of the reduced form welfare function of country 1 is as follows:
dW1
dλ1
=
∂W1
∂λ1
+
∂W1
∂α1
α01 (λ1)
and using (30), (31) and (35), we obtain the following:
dW1
dλ1
= P 0 (R∗1)C1
∙
∂R∗1
∂λ1
+ α01 (λ1)
∂R∗1
∂α1
¸
− 2P (R∗1)
Z 1
α1
φ01 (z) dz. (38)
At the optimum, country 1 selects λ1 such that
dW1
dλ1
= 0. (39)
The solution of the above equation is denoted by λˆ1 (λ2) and is known as the reaction function of
country 1 as a function of λ2. The reaction function of country 1 captures the total impact on the
optimal λ1 due to a change in λ2, where the total impact includes the direct impact on λ1 because
of the change in λ2 and an indirect impact on λ1 because of a change in α1. We now determine
the slope of λˆ1 (λ2) and show that the rate of change of the marginal product in R&D is a crucial
determinant of whether the reaction functions are downward or upward sloping, that is, whether
patent lengths are strategic substitutes or strategic complements (Bulow et al., 1985).
Proposition 4 (i) If σ0 (R∗1) > −σ2 (R∗1) is satisfied, then λˆ
0
1 (λ2) < 0. (ii) If λˆ
0
1 (λ2) > 0, then
σ0 (R∗1) < −σ2 (R∗1).
The first part of the proposition above states that the reaction function of country 1 is downward
sloping if the rate of change of the marginal product in R&D (measured by the curvature of the
production function) itself does not decrease too rapidly with an increase in the R&D eﬀort. If
σ0 (R∗1) > −σ2 (R∗1), then Lemma 2 implies that the patent lengths are substitutable inputs and
hence, it follows from the discussion in the section above that λ1 decreases in response to an
increase in λ2. The second part of the proposition states the necessary condition under which the
reaction function of country 1 is upward sloping. In particular, if the reaction function of country
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1 is upward sloping, then the rate of change of the marginal product in R&D (measured by the
curvature of the production function) must decrease very rapidly with an increase in R&D eﬀort.
There may be a concern that in practice, the patent breadth in the developed countries is anyway
set at the maximum possible level, and hence for all practical purposes, the only policy lever that
governments in developed countries have is the patent length. We can address this concern in
two ways that are described below. First, we show that the basic conclusions of the model would
not change even if this concern was true in practice. To see this, suppose country 1 sets its patent
breadth at the maximum level and only chooses the length. In terms of our model, this is equivalent
to saying that α1 is exogenously set equal to 0, and country 1 eﬀectively only chooses λ1. In that
case, the first order condition of country 1 would be as follows:
∂W1
∂λ1
= P 0 (R∗1)C1
∂R∗1
∂λ1
− P (R∗1)
Z 1
0
φ01 (z) dz = 0. (40)
Note that (40) is derived from (30) with α1 = 0. Following similar methods as above, it can be
shown that λˆ
0
1 (λ2) will positive in some cases and negative in other cases.
Second, we show that even empirically, there are cases that suggest that the patent breadth is
not automatically set at the maximum level in the developed countries. In this context, we high-
light certain examples from the pharmaceutical industry in USA. In the American pharmaceutical
industry, the entry of generics is governed by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restora-
tion Act (1984), commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. One of the provisions of this act
(Paragraph IV) allows a generic producer to file an application (known as Abbreviated New Drug
Application, or ANDA) if the generic producer can certify that the generic drug does not infringe
upon an existing patent or that the patent is not valid. Further, the applicant is required to notify
the original patentee of this application and the patentee has to sue within 45 days for infringement.
Such litigation can sometimes go in favor of the patentee but sometimes the challenger ends up as
the winner. Indeed, the FTC in a report in 2002 examined the outcome of 53 of these cases (Table
2-2, p. 17 of the report). Out of these 53 cases, 20 were settled by the brand-name company and
the first generic applicant, 22 of these cases were won by the generic applicant and only 8 were
won by the brand-name company. In 2007, the Federal Trade Commission prepared a report for a
Congressional committee that provided examples of certain generics which were launched before the
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expiry of the patent on the branded drug. As an example, it follows from page 10 of the report that
the generic equivalent of the drug Prilosec (produced by Kudco which is a subsidiary of Schwarz
Pharma Group) was launched in 2002 while the patents on the drug are scheduled to expire as late
as 2018. Another example is a settlement between Ranbaxy and Pfizer over the rights to Lipitor.
A press release by Ranbaxy (dated June 18, 2008) announced that Ranbaxy would have the right
to sell the generic version of Lipitor (known as Atorvastatin) in the United States from November
30, 2011. The same press release further noted that "The Atorvastatin patents involved in this
agreement are the basic compound patent, which expires in the United States in 2010; the enan-
tiomer patent, which expires in the United States in 2011; and various process and crystalline form
patents, which expire in 2016 and 2017; and the combination patent for fixed-dose combination
product which expires in 2018." Notice that the last patent mentioned in the agreement will expire
only in 2018. To summarize, a patentee has to prove that its patent is valid and that an imitator’s
action constitutes an infringement. If the patent breadth had indeed been set at the maximum
level, then the patentees would have almost no incentive to settle and would have won in a vast
majority of the lawsuits. But the evidence does not corroborate this.
6 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
In this model, the governments simultaneously choose their IP laws in the first period and firm
1 selects its R&D eﬀort in period 2. Therefore, the equilibrium concept that we use is sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium and we determine the equilibrium by backward induction. The equilibrium
of the model is defined as follows:
Definition 1 The subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium is the profile (λ∗1, λ
∗
2, R∗1) that satisfies (11),
λˆ1 (λ∗2) = λ
∗
1 and λˆ2 (λ
∗
1) = λ
∗
2
Below, we discuss the comparative statics of the model. In order to do so, we need to determine
the relative slopes of the reaction functions which are commonly known as the stability conditions.
Below we show that stability of the model can be guaranteed if the following assumption is satisfied
by the primitives of the model in a neighborhood of the equilibrium:
For any i = 1, 2,
¯¯¯¯
∂2Wi
∂λ2i
¯¯¯¯
>
¯¯¯¯
∂2Wi
∂λ1∂λ2
¯¯¯¯
. (41)
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If condition (41) is satisfied, then in a neighborhood of the equilibrium, the absolute value of the
slope of λˆ1 (λ2) with respect to λ1 must be greater than the absolute value of the slope of λˆ2 (λ1)
with respect to λ1. This is demonstrated below:
Lemma 3 Suppose (41) is satisfied. Then, there exists a neighborhood of the equilibrium such that
¯¯¯
λˆ
0
2 (λ1)
¯¯¯
< 1 <
¯¯¯¯
¯ 1λˆ01 (λ2)
¯¯¯¯
¯ . (42)
If the reaction functions of both countries are negatively (resp., positively) sloped, then condition
(42) implies that in Figures 4, 5 and 6, the reaction function of country 1 is steeper than the reaction
function of country 2 around the equilibrium point. Notice that this ensures that the reaction
functions do not violate the stability conditions. This result will also be used in deriving the results
below.
We now use Lemma 3 to derive some comparative static results. In order to present our results,
we denote the equilibrium patent length of country i at the initial value of some parameter by
λ∗i and the equilibrium patent length of country i after the change in that parameter by λ
∗∗
i . In
other words, the original equilibrium is the point (λ∗1, λ
∗
2) and the new equilibrium is at the point
(λ∗∗1 , λ
∗∗
2 ). For comparative statics, we focus on c2 (1) that measures the willingness-to-pay in the
emerging economy. Below, we analyze the impact of an increase in the willingness-to-pay in the
emerging economy (possibly because of an increase in income), both when φ01 (α) > 0 (as in Example
4) and when φ01 (α) < 0 (as in Example 3).
6.1 Impact of a change in c2 (1) when φ01 (α) > 0
Suppose the willingness-to-pay in the emerging economy, given by c2 (1), increases. Then, we
find that the impact on the patent lengths and breadths depend on the reaction functions of the
two countries. Therefore, we analyze the following cases:
Case 1 λˆ
0
1 (λ2) < 0 and λˆ
0
2 (λ1) < 0
In this case, the patent lengths of both countries are strategic substitutes. It follows from
Propositions (2) and (4) that such a case can arise when the rate of change of the marginal product
in R&D (measured by the curvature of the R&D production function) does not decrease too rapidly,
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that is, when σ0 (R∗1) > −σ2 (R∗1). In this case, the emerging economy increases its patent length
and the developed economy reduces its patent length. This result is summarized below.
Proposition 5 Suppose (42) is satisfied. Further, let λˆ
0
1 (λ2) < 0 and λˆ
0
2 (λ1) < 0. Then, an
increase in c2 (1) has the following impact on the patent lengths:
λ∗∗1 < λ
∗
1 and λ
∗∗
2 > λ
∗
2.
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is summarized in the first quadrant of Figure 4. Note that
when there is a change in the willingness-to-pay in country 2, the reaction function of country 2 (the
emerging country) shifts upward, while the reaction function of country 1 (the developed country)
does not shift at all. Further, in this case, both reaction functions are downward sloping. Observe
that (42) then implies that for λ1 < λ∗1, the reaction function function of country 2 lies below the
reaction function of country 1, while for λ1 > λ∗1, the reaction function of country 2 lies above the
reaction function of country 1. Hence, the new equilibrium, given by point D in Figure 4 lies along
the reaction function of country 1 to the left of initial equilibrium, given by point A. Consequently,
in this case, the patent length increases in country 2 and reduces in country 1. In other words, an
increase in the willingness to pay in country 2 induces country 2 to increase its patent length and
since for country 1, patent lengths are strategic substitutes, therefore country 1 free rides on the
improved patent protection of country 2 by reducing its patent length.
Finally, one may want to know the impact on the patent breadths of an increase in the
willingness-to-pay in the emerging economy. The impact on the patent breadth in country 2 can
be determined from the second quadrant in Figure 4. In this quadrant, the schedules relating the
optimal patent breadth and the optimal patent length of country 2 have been plotted, for a fixed
value of λ1. Given that the patent lengths are substitutable inputs for country 2, therefore, a de-
crease in λ1 leads to an upward pivot of the schedule relating optimal patent length and optimal
patent breadth in country 2.12 The net impact on the patent breadth in country 2 therefore depends
on the magnitude of the upward pivot of the schedule in the second quadrant of Figure 4. If the
upward pivot is large enough (as in Figure 4), the patent breadth in country 2 decreases from point
B to point E. However, if the upward pivot had been small enough, then the patent breadth in
12This follows from the discussion around Figure 3.
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Figure 4: The impact of a change in the willingness-to-pay in country 2 when the reaction functions
of both countries are downward sloping. In this case, an increase in the willingness-to-pay in country
2 changes the profile of patent lengths from A to D. Further, the patent breadth of country 2 shifts
from B to E while the patent breadth of country 1 shifts from C to F . Hence, there is a reduction
in the patent length in country 1 and an increase in the patent length in country 2. The impact on
the patent breadths is ambiguous.
country 2 would have increased. Similarly, the impact on the patent breadth of country 1 depends
on the magnitude of pivot of the schedule relating the optimal patent length and the optimal patent
breadth in country 1.13
Assume that the patent length and the patent breadth are greater in the developed economy
initially. Then, in this case, an increase in the willingness-to-pay in the emerging economy leads
to a convergence of patent lengths but not necessarily in patent breadths. The conclusion is that
convergence in one aspect of the patent law need not imply convergence in all aspects.
Case 2 λˆ
0
1 (λ2) < 0 and λˆ
0
2 (λ1) > 0
In this case, the patent lengths are strategic substitutes for country 1 but are strategic com-
plements for country 2. By comparing the results from Propositions (2) and (4), it follows that
13Note that the relationship between the optimal patent length and the optimal patent breadth in the previous
two sections have been derived under the assumption that the structure of IP law in the foreign country is fixed. In
contrast, the analysis in this section allows the law in the foreign country to vary as well.
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Figure 5: The impact of a change in the willingness-to-pay in country 2 when the reaction function
of country 1 is upward sloping and the reaction function of country 2 is downward sloping. In this
case, an increase in the willingness-to-pay in country 2 leads to a shorter patent length in country
1 and a longer patent length in country 2. Country 2 also adopts broader patents but the impact
on the patent breadth of country 1 is ambiguous.
one instance in which this case can arise is if σ0 (R∗1) < −σ2 (R∗1).14 The equilibrium in this case is
depicted in Figure 5. The initial equilibrium is at point A and an increase in the willingness-to-pay
leads to the new equilibrium point D. This implies that the patent length in the emerging econ-
omy increases and the patent length in the developed economy decreases. The eﬀect on the patent
breadth in the developed economy is ambiguous as in the previous case. However, in contrast to
the previous case, the patent breadth in the emerging economy unambiguously increases. This is
depicted in the second quadrant of Figure 5. This result occurs because of the downward pivot of
the schedule relating the optimal patent breadth and the optimal patent length in the emerging
economy. In this case, the patent laws in the emerging economy are strengthened both in terms of
length and breadth.
Case 3 λˆ
0
1 (λ2) > 0 and λˆ
0
2 (λ1) < 0
14Note that σ0 (R∗1) > −σ2 (R∗1) is only a suﬃcient condition for the reaction function of country 1 to be downward
sloping. Hence, nothing precludes the reaction function of country 1 to be downward sloping even if the suﬃcient
condition is violated.
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Figure 6: The impact of a change in the willingness-to-pay in country 2 when the reaction function
of country 1 is upward rising. In this case, an increase in the willingness-to-pay in country 2 leads
to a longer patent length in either country.
In this case, it can be shown using Figure 6 that the patent lengths increase in both countries.
Further, the patent breadth in the emerging economy increases while the impact on the patent
breadth in the developed economy is ambiguous.
Case 4 λˆ
0
1 (λ2) > 0 and λˆ
0
2 (λ1) > 0
It follows from Figure 6 that the patent lengths increase in both countries. Further, it can be
shown that the patent breadth also increase in both countries.
Hence, to summarize the four cases, an increase in the willingness-to-pay in the emerging econ-
omy even without an accompanying increase in research capability unambiguously leads to an
improvement of the degree of IP protection in the emerging economy both in terms of length and
breadth in Case 2 to 4. Therefore, in these cases, the problem of weak patent protection in emerg-
ing economies is likely to diminish with an increase in their incomes (even if there is no significant
increase of their research capabilities). However, this result may not hold in Case 1, in which both
reaction functions are negatively sloped.
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6.2 Impact of a change in c2 (1) when φ01 (α) < 0
In this case, as discussed in the previous section, the optimal λ1 is 1 and the optimal α1 is 0.
Any change in the willingness-to-pay in the emerging economy has no impact on the patent laws in
the developed economy. Hence, we focus on the impact of the change in the willingness-to-pay in
the emerging economy on the patent law in the emerging economy. First, we consider the case of a
downward sloping reaction function of the emerging economy. This case has been depicted in Figure
7. Notice that the reaction function of the developed economy is a vertical line corresponding to
the maximum patent length. An increase in the willingness-to-pay in the emerging economy leads
to an upward shift of the reaction function of the emerging economy. This leads to an increase
in the patent length in the emerging economy. Further, there is no pivot of the schedule relating
the optimal patent length with the optimal patent breadth in the emerging economy because the
patent length of the developed economy does not change at all. This implies that the optimal
patent breadth in the emerging economy must increase. Therefore, in this case, an increase in the
willingness-to-pay in the emerging economy unambiguously leads to a stronger patent law in the
emerging economy, both in terms of length and in terms of breadth. The same conclusion can be
drawn in the case in which the reaction function of the emerging economy is upward sloping.
7 Extensions
7.1 The Global Planner’s Problem
In this subsection, we determine the IP laws that would be selected by a global planner and
compare it to the IP laws that are selected by the governments acting in their best interest. In the
initial part of the discussion, we do not consider harmonized IP laws but later on we extend the
analysis to the case of harmonized IP laws. The global planner solves the following problem:
Max| {z } WGP = P (R∗1) (C1 + V1 + C2 + V2)−R∗1.
λ1, α1, λ2, α2
An implicit assumption in our analysis is that the global planner can select the IP laws (as the
governments could in the sections above) but has no direct control over the amount of R&D eﬀort
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Figure 7: The impact of a change in the willingness-to-pay in country 2 when φ01 (α) < 0. In this
case, an increase in the willingness-to-pay in country 2 unambiguously leads to an increase in the
degree of patent protection in the emerging economy.
that firm 1 exerts. Hence, firm 1’s optimal amount of R&D eﬀort is still determined by (11).
To determine the diﬀerence in incentives of the global planner with the individual governments,
we need to compare the first order conditions of the global planner with those of the individual
governments. First, consider the first order condition of the global planner with respect to λ1. This
is given by the following:
∂WGP
∂λ1
= P 0 (R∗1) (C1 + C2 + V2)
∂R∗1
∂λ1
− P (R∗1)
Z 1
α1
[φ01 (z) + π
0
21 (z)] dz = 0. (43)
It is instructive at this stage to compare (43) with (30). The direct eﬀect of an increase in λ1 is given
by the term P (R∗1)
R 1
α1
φ01 (z) dz for country 1 and by P (R∗1)
R 1
α1
[φ01 (z) + π021 (z)] dz for the global
planner. The additional term π021 (z) that is included in (43) however has an ambiguous sign; in
particular, it may be positive for a cost-reducing technology (as in Example 3) and may be negative
for a quality enhancing technology (as in Example 4). Hence, the direct eﬀect is greater for a global
planner for the case of a cost-reducing technology and is less for a global planner for the case of
a quality enhancing technology. Next, consider the indirect eﬀect given by the term P 0 (R∗1)C1
∂R∗1
∂λ1
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for country 1 and by P 0 (R∗1) (C1 + C2 + V2)
∂R∗1
∂λ1
for the global planner and notice that the indirect
eﬀect is higher for the global planner. The conclusion is that for a cost-reducing technology, the
direct eﬀect and the indirect eﬀect are both higher for the global planner, and hence, the net impact
of the global planner on λ1 is ambiguous. In contrast, for a quality enhancing technology, the direct
eﬀect is lower and the indirect eﬀect is higher for the global planner, and hence, everything else
remaining constant, the global planner has an incentive to increase λ1.
Next, consider the first order condition of the global planner with respect to λ2. This is given
by the following:
∂WGP
∂λ2
= P 0 (R∗1) (C1 + V1 + C2 + V2)
∂R∗1
∂λ2
− P (R∗1)
Z 1
α2
[φ02 (z) + π
0
12 (z)] dz = 0. (44)
In order to examine the diﬀerence in incentives between the global planner and the government
of country 2, we compare (44) and (20). The direct eﬀect is given by P (R∗1)
R 1
α2
φ02 (z) dz for
country 2 and by P (R∗1)
R 1
α2
[φ02 (z) + π012 (z)] dz for the global planner. Notice that the term π012 (z)
is unambiguously negative and hence, the direct eﬀect is lower for the global planner. Further,
the indirect eﬀect is higher for the global planner. Hence, the conclusion is that, everything else
remaining constant, the global planner has an incentive to increase λ2 and this result holds for both
a cost reducing technology as well as for a quality enhancing technology. Similar kinds of results
can be obtained by examining the first order conditions of the global planner with respect to α1
and α2.
Finally, we examine if harmonized patent laws are optimal from the perspective of the global
planner. The answer here is that harmonized patent laws are generally not optimal but can hold
only for very specific parameter values. To see this, consider the first order conditions (43) and (44)
with α1 being equal to α2. Notice that even in this case, the optimal λ1 will in general be diﬀerent
from the optimal λ2 because the two first order conditions include a few diﬀerent terms.
7.2 Both countries invest in R&D
In this subsection, we analyze the case in which both countries engage in R&D. However, we
assume naturally that firm 2 is not as adept in R&D as firm 1. This idea is captured by assuming
that kR units of R&D eﬀort by firm 2 is equivalent to R units of R&D eﬀort by firm 1 where k ≥ 1
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captures the relative degree of ineﬃciency of firm 2’s R&D eﬀort with respect to firm 1’s R&D
eﬀort. In the sections above, it was assumed that firm 2 does not engage in R&D. This can indeed
occur endogenously if k is suﬃciently large. A reduction of the value of k implies an improvement
of firm 2’s eﬃciency in R&D, and in the extreme, a value of k = 1 implies that firm 2 is as eﬃcient
as firm 1 in R&D. A complete analysis of this case is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the
purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the insights derived in the sections above hold even
when we allow for firm 2 to engage in R&D. In order to ensure tractability, we however allow each
country to endogenously choose one aspect of the IP law and the other aspect is assumed to be
exogenous. In particular, in the discussion below, we allow each country to choose its patent length
and the breadth is assumed to be exogenous. One can check that the results hold in the converse
case in which the length is assumed to be exogenous instead.
Because both firms engage in R&D, therefore a winner will be deemed to be the firm that is
awarded a patent. Hence, let P (R1, R2) be the probability that firm 1 is awarded a patent and
1 − P (R1, R2) be the probability that firm 2 is awarded a patent. Note that in this section, we
rule out the possibility that both firms are unsuccesful. This is just a simplifying assuption and
the results can be derived even without this assumption. The function P (R1, R2) is assumed to be
increasing in firm 1’s eﬀort and decreasing in firm 2’s R&D eﬀort, that is,
∂P (·)
∂R1
> 0 and
∂P (·)
∂R2
< 0.
We also assume that
∂2P (·)
∂R21
< 0 and
∂2P (·)
∂R22
> 0. (45)
The assumptions in (45) are required for the second order conditions below.
Next, we consider the profit functions of firms 1 and 2. In the sections above, the instantaneous
profit of firm i in country j conditional on a successful innovation was denoted by πij (αj). Notice
that the function πij (·) had only argument because there was no ambiguity about the direction of
the knowledge spillover (from firm 1 to firm 2). However, in this subsection, since we allow both
firms to conduct R&D, therefore, the flow of knowledge could be in either direction depending on
the identity of the patentee. For example, if firm 1 is the patentee, then knowledge flows from firm
1 to firm 2, while if firm 2 is the patentee, then knowledge flows from firm 2 to firm 1 instead. In
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order to capture both possibilities, we let π˜ij (x, y) be the instantaneous profit of firm i in country
j when the knowledge spillover from firm 1 to firm 2 is x and the knowledge spillover from firm 2 to
firm 1 is y. For instance, suppose firm 2 is the patentee and suppose the patent breadth in country
j is (1− αj). Then, the instantaneous profit of firm i in country j is given by π˜ij (0, αj). In order
to be consistent with (1), we assume that the instantaneous profit of a firm diminishes if there is
any knowledge spillover to the competing firm, that is,
∂π˜1j (x, ·)
∂x
< 0 and
∂π˜2j (·, y)
∂y
< 0.
We also assume that the impact of a given degree of knowledge spillover will be higher on the provider
of the knowledge rather than on the recipient. This is formalized by the following assumptions:
|∂π˜1j (α, 0)
∂α
| > |∂π˜1j (0, α)
∂α
| and |∂π˜2j (0, α)
∂α
| > |∂π˜2j (α, 0)
∂α
|.
Let us consider the first of these two assumptions. The term |∂π˜1j(α,0)∂α | is the marginal impact on
firm 1 if an amount of knowledge α flows out of firm 1 to firm 2, while |∂π˜1j(0,α)∂α | is the marginal
impact on firm 1 if the same amount of knowledge α flows out of firm 2 to firm 1 instead. The
first assumption implies that the marginal loss to firm 1 from being the provider of the knowledge
α is greater than the marginal impact on firm 1 from being the recipient. These assumptions are
required in the proof of Lemma 4 below.
Next, let V ji be the gross profit of firm i given that firm j is the patentee. First, consider the
gross profit of firm 1, given that firm 1 is the patentee. This is denoted by V 11 and is given below.
V 11 = λ1π˜11 (α1, 0) + (1− λ1) π˜11 (1, 0) + λ2π˜12 (α2, 0) + (1− λ2) π˜12 (1, 0)
= π˜11 (1, 0) + π˜12 (1, 0)− λ1
Z 1
α1
∂π˜11 (x, 0)
∂x
dx− λ2
Z 1
α2
∂π˜12 (x, 0)
∂x
dx.
Note that the above expression is analogous to (4). Next, consider the gross profit of firm 1, given
that firm 2 is the patentee. This is given below:
V 21 = λ1π˜11 (0, α1) + (1− λ1) π˜11 (0, 1) + λ2π˜12 (0, α2) + (1− λ2) π˜12 (0, 1)
= π˜11 (0, 1) + π˜12 (0, 1)− λ1
Z 1
α1
∂π˜11 (0, y)
∂y
dy − λ2
Z 1
α2
∂π˜12 (0, y)
∂y
dy.
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Finally, consider the gross profit of firm 2 when firm 1 is the patentee and when firm 2 is the
patentee. These are denoted by V 12 and V 22 respectively and are as follows:
V 12 = π˜21 (1, 0) + π˜22 (1, 0)− λ1
Z 1
α1
∂π˜21 (x, 0)
∂x
dx− λ2
Z 1
α2
∂π˜22 (x, 0)
∂x
dx,
and
V 22 = π˜21 (0, 1) + π˜22 (0, 1)− λ1
Z 1
α1
∂π˜21 (0, y)
∂y
dy − λ2
Z 1
α2
∂π˜22 (0, y)
∂y
dy.
In order to derive the first order conditions (46) and (47) below, we need to ensure that V 11 > V 21
and V 22 > V 12 . In other words, we need to ensure that a firm is better oﬀ it is the inventor rather
than an imitator, for any fixed structure of IP laws. A suﬃcient condition for V 11 > V 21 is the
following boundary condition:
π˜11 (1, 0) + π˜12 (1, 0) > π˜11 (0, 1) + π˜12 (0, 1) .
Similarly, we can ensure that V 22 > V 12 by assuming the following boundary condition:
π˜21 (0, 1) + π˜22 (0, 1) > π˜21 (1, 0) + π˜22 (1, 0) .
The inequality V 22 > V 12 captures an interesting distinction between the sections above in which
firm 2 is assumed to not engage in R&D and this section in which firm 2 is assumed to engage in
R&D. When firm 2 itself does not expend eﬀort in R&D, then its gross payoﬀ is V2 when firm 1
succeeds in R&D and is 0 when firm 1 fails. Since V2 > 0, therefore firm 1’s success in R&D is
"good news" for firm 2. On the other hand, when firm 2 expends eﬀort in R&D, then its gross
payoﬀ is V 12 when firm 1 succeeds in R&D and is V 22 when firm 1 fails. The inequality V 22 > V 12
then implies that in contrast to the previous case, firm 1’s success in R&D is in fact "bad news"
for firm 2.
We preserve the same timeline as in the sections above, that is, in period 1, the two countries
simultaneously select their IP laws and in period 2 the firms simultaneously determine their R&D
eﬀort. Finally, the outcomes of the R&D are known and firms make profits. Given the sequential
nature of moves, we first solve for the equilibrium in period 2. First, we determine the R&D eﬀort
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of firm 2, given that the R&D eﬀort of firm 1 is R∗1. In this case, firm 2 solves the following problem:
Max| {z } P (R∗1, R2)V 12 + [1− P (R∗1, R2)]V 22 − kR2.
R2
At the optimum R&D eﬀort of firm 2, that is at R2 = R∗2, the following condition must be satisfied:
−∂P (R
∗
1, R∗2)
∂R2
¡
V 22 − V 12
¢
= k. (46)
Notice that the (46) has an interior solution only if V 22 > V 12 . Similarly, at R1 = R∗1, the following
condition must be satisfied by firm 1:
∂P (R∗1, R∗2)
∂R1
¡
V 11 − V 21
¢
= 1. (47)
Note that these first order conditions are similar to (11). The second order conditions are satisfied
because of (45).
Next, in Lemma 4 below, we demonstrate that the optimal R&D eﬀorts are increasing in the
patent lengths. These results are therefore analogous to the one shown in Lemma 1. In order to
show Lemma 4, we define the curvature of the R&D production function as follows:
σi (R1, R2) = | ∂∂Ri ln
∂P (·)
∂Ri
| = |
∂2P (·)
∂R2i
∂P (·)
∂Ri
|.
Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4 At the optimum level of R&D eﬀort,
∂R∗1
∂λ1
= −
∂P(R∗1 ,R∗2)
∂R1
σ1 (R∗1, R∗2)
Z 1
α1
∙
∂π˜11 (z, 0)
∂z
− ∂π˜11 (0, z)
∂z
¸
dz > 0,
∂R∗1
∂λ2
= −
∂P(R∗1 ,R∗2)
∂R1
σ1 (R∗1, R∗2)
Z 1
α2
∙
∂π˜12 (z, 0)
∂z
− ∂π˜12 (0, z)
∂z
¸
dz > 0,
∂R∗2
∂λ1
=
1
k
∂P(R∗1 ,R∗2)
∂R2
σ2 (R∗1, R∗2)
Z 1
α1
∙
∂π˜21 (0, z)
∂z
− ∂π˜21 (z, 0)
∂z
¸
dz > 0 (48)
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and
∂R∗2
∂λ2
=
1
k
∂P(R∗1 ,R∗2)
∂R2
σ2 (R∗1, R∗2)
Z 1
α2
∙
∂π˜22 (0, z)
∂z
− ∂π˜22 (z, 0)
∂z
¸
dz > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice from the above lemma that an increase in the degree of ineﬃciency in R&D (measured
by an increase in k) leads to a reduction in the responsiveness of R2. In the extreme, if k is infinitely
high, then firm 2’s R&D eﬀort does not respond at all to any increase in the patent length.
We now determine the optimal patent length of the emerging country (country 2). To do so,
notice that country 2 solves the following problem:
Max| {z } W˜2 = C2 + P (R∗1, R∗2)V 12 + [1− P (R∗1, R∗2)]V 22 − kR∗2.
λ2
(49)
It is instructive at this point to examine the terms involved in the welfare function of country 2 when
it invests in R&D (given above) with its welfare function when it does not invest in R&D (as given
by (19)). Notice that the first term in (49) is the consumer surplus. In this section, it is assumed
that at least one of the firms will be successful in R&D and the uncertainty is about the identity of
the successful firm; thus, the term C2 is not multiplied by the function P (·). In contrast, in (19),
there is uncertainty about the success of the invention, and hence, in that case, C2 is multiplied
by the function P (·). Next, consider the term P (R∗1, R∗2)V 12 + [1− P (R∗1, R∗2)]V 22 . This is simply
the expected gross profit of firm 2, because it is the imitator with probability P (R∗1, R∗2) and is the
inventor with probability 1 − P (R∗1, R∗2). Finally, the last term is the cost that firm 2 incurs in
R&D. As mentioned earlier, in this section, we allow country 2 to determine only its patent length
λ2, while its patent breadth α2 will be assumed to be exogenous. Hence, by diﬀerentiating (49), we
obtain the following:
∂W2
∂λ2
= −∂P (R
∗
1, R∗2)
∂R1
¡
V 22 − V 12
¢ ∂R∗1
∂λ2
+
∙
−∂P (R
∗
1, R∗2)
∂R2
¡
V 22 − V 12
¢
− k
¸
∂R∗2
∂λ2
−
Z 1
α2
∙
c02 (z) +
∂π˜22 (0, z)
∂z
¸
dz + P (R∗1, R
∗
2)
Z 1
α2
∙
∂π˜22 (0, z)
∂z
− ∂π˜22 (z, 0)
∂z
¸
dz.
Note that the second term on the right hand side is 0 because of (46). Hence, at the optimum
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solution, the following equation must be satisfied:
∂W2
∂λ2
= −∂P (R
∗
1, R∗2)
∂R1
¡
V 22 − V 12
¢ ∂R∗1
∂λ2
−
Z 1
α2
∙
c02 (z) +
∂π˜22 (0, z)
∂z
¸
dz + P (R∗1, R
∗
2)
Z 1
α2
∙
∂π˜22 (0, z)
∂z
− ∂π˜22 (z, 0)
∂z
¸
dz = 0. (50)
Notice that (50) is analogous to (20) where the first term is the indirect eﬀect of increasing the
patent length while the second and third terms measure the direct eﬀect of increasing the patent
length. Note that the first and third terms are negative but the sign of the second term is ambiguous.
Hence, in order to guarantee an interior solution, we require that |∂π˜22(0,z)∂z | > c02 (z). The solution
of the above equation is denoted by bˆλ2 (λ1) and is known as the reaction function of country 2 as
a function of λ1. We now determine the slope of
bˆλ2 (λ1) and show that while it is possible for the
reaction function to be downward sloping under certain circumstances, it is also possible for the
reaction function to be upward sloping under other circumstances.
Proposition 6 The slope of bˆλ2 (λ1) has an ambiguous sign.
Proof. See the Appendix.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed the incentive of emerging economies to free ride on improved
patent protection in the developed economies. We have three major conclusions: (i) Under plausible
conditions, the optimal patent length and the optimal patent breadth in a country have a positive
relationship with one another when the structure of IP laws is fixed in other countries. (ii) Patent
lengths across countries may be positively or negatively related depending on the manner in which
the curvature of the R&D production function changes. (iii) An increase in the willingness-to-pay in
the emerging economy need not always lead to an improvement in both dimensions of IP protection,
that is, the patent length and the patent breadth. All of these predictions are empirically testable
and we leave this point for future research.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
We prove only (12) and the rest of the proof can be done analogously. At the optimum level of
R&D eﬀort, (11) holds. Hence, by applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain the following:
∂R∗1
∂λ1
= −
R 1
α1
π011 (z) dz
σ (R∗1)V1
. (51)
By substituting (11) into (51), we obtain (12).
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B Proof of Lemma 2
We only prove (16) and the rest of the proof can be done analogously. It follows from (11) that
P 0 (R∗1)V1 − 1 = 0.
Hence, using the implicit function theorem, we obtain that
∂R∗1
∂λ1
= −
R 1
α1
π011 (z) dz
σ (R∗1)V1
.
Now, suppose that λ2 also changes. Then, in the expression above, the numerator remains un-
changed but both terms in the denominator change. A change in λ2 changes V1 and hence changes
the optimal amount of R&D eﬀort of firm 1. However, any change in the R&D eﬀort of firm 1 also
changes the curvature of the R&D production function and this has a further feedback eﬀect on the
level of R&D eﬀort. Hence,
∂2R∗1
∂λ2∂λ1
=
R 1
α1
π011 (z) dz
(σ (R∗1)V1)
2
½
σ (R∗1)
∂V1
∂λ2
+ σ0 (R∗1)V1
∂R∗1
∂λ2
¾
(52)
Next, notice that
∂V1
∂λ2
= −
Z 1
α2
π012 (z) dz (53)
and
∂R∗1
∂λ2
= −
R 1
α2
π012 (z) dz
σ (R∗1)V1
. (54)
Substituting (53) and (54) into (52), we obtain that
∂2R∗1
∂λ2∂λ1
= −
³R 1
α1
π011 (z) dz
´³R 1
α2
π012 (z) dz
´
σ3 (R∗1)V 21
©
σ2 (R∗1) + σ
0 (R∗1)
ª
.
Notice that
−
³R 1
α1
π011 (z) dz
´³R 1
α2
π012 (z) dz
´
σ3 (R∗1)V 21
< 0.
Hence,
sign
µ
∂2R∗1
∂λ1∂λ2
¶
= −sign
¡
σ2 (R∗1) + σ
0 (R∗1)
¢
.
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The rest of the proof proceeds along similar lines.
C Proof of Proposition 1
By integrating both sides of (25), we obtain the following:
Z α2
0
d lnλ2 (x) =
Z α2
0
d ln
µZ 1
x
φ02 (z) dz
¶
from which it follows that
λ2 (α2)
λ2 (0)
=
R 1
α2
φ02 (z) dzR 1
0
φ02 (z) dz
.
Hence, we obtain the result.
D Proof of Proposition 2
Consider country 2. At the optimum,
dW2
dλ2
= 0.
Therefore, by applying the implicit function theorem, it follows that
λˆ
0
2 (λ1) = −
∂2W2
∂λ1∂λ2
∂2W2
∂λ22
,
where λˆ
0
2 (λ1) is the change in λ2 for a unit change in λ1 along country 2’s reaction function. From
the second order condition, it follows that
∂2W2
∂λ22
< 0.
Therefore,
sign
³
λˆ
0
2 (λ1)
´
= sign
µ
∂2W2
∂λ1∂λ2
¶
.
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From (27), it follows that along country 2’s reaction function,
∂2W2
∂λ1∂λ2
= P 00 (R∗1) (C2 + V2)
∙
∂R∗1
∂λ2
+ α02 (λ2)
∂R∗1
∂α2
¸
∂R∗1
∂λ1
−P 0 (R∗1)
∙
∂R∗1
∂λ2
+ α02 (λ2)
∂R∗1
∂α2
¸Z 1
α1
π021 (z) dz
+P 0 (R∗1) (C2 + V2)
∙
∂2R∗1
∂λ1∂λ2
+
∂
∂λ1
µ
α02 (λ2)
∂R∗1
∂α2
¶¸
−2P 0 (R∗1)
Z 1
α2
φ02 (z) dz
∂R∗1
∂λ1
. (55)
Observe that the first and fourth terms on the right hand side are negative. Further, the second
term is also negative if π021 (α) > 0 for all α. Finally, consider the third term and notice that
∂
∂λ1
µ
α02 (λ2)
∂R∗1
∂α2
¶
=
(
−
R 1
α2
φ02 (z) dz
φ02 (α2)
π012 (α2)
) ³R 1
α1
π011 (z) dz
´
σ3 (R∗1)V 21
©
σ2 (R∗1) + σ
0 (R∗1)
ª
.
Hence,
sign
µ
α02 (λ2)
∂R∗1
∂α2
¶
= −sign
¡
σ2 (R∗1) + σ
0 (R∗1)
¢
= sign
µ
∂2R∗1
∂λ1∂λ2
¶
and therefore the third term in (55) is also negative if σ0 (R∗1) > −σ2 (R∗1). Consequently it follows
that ∂
2W2
∂λ1∂λ2
< 0 if π021 (α) > 0 and if σ0 (R∗1) > −σ2 (R∗1).
For the converse, notice that ∂
2W2
∂λ1∂λ2
> 0 can be satisfied only if either the second or the third
term (or both) is positive. Hence, the result follows.
E Proof of Lemma 4
We prove only (48) and the rest of the proof can be done analogously. At the optimum level of
R&D eﬀort, (46) holds. Hence, by applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain the following:
∂R∗2
∂λ1
= −
R 1
α1
h
∂π˜21(0,z)
∂z −
∂π˜21(z,0)
∂z
i
dz
σ2 (R∗1, R∗2) (V 22 − V 12 )
. (56)
By substituting (46) into (56), we obtain (48).
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F Proof of Proposition 6
Consider country 2. At the optimum,
∂W˜2
∂λ2
= 0.
Therefore, bˆλ02 (λ1) = − ∂2W˜2∂λ1∂λ2∂2W˜2
∂λ22
,
where bˆλ02 (λ1) is the change in λ2 for a unit change in λ1 along country 2’s reaction function. From
the second order condition, it follows that
∂2W2
∂λ22
< 0.
Therefore,
sign
µbˆλ02 (λ1)¶ = sign µ ∂2W2∂λ1∂λ2
¶
.
From (50), it follows that along country 2’s reaction function,
∂2W2
∂λ1∂λ2
= −∂
2P (R∗1, R∗2)
∂R21
¡
V 22 − V 12
¢ ∂R∗1
∂λ2
∂R∗1
∂λ1
−∂
2P (R∗1, R∗2)
∂R1∂R2
¡
V 22 − V 12
¢ ∂R∗1
∂λ2
∂R∗2
∂λ1
+
∂P (R∗1, R∗2)
∂R1
½Z 1
α1
∙
∂π˜21 (0, z)
∂z
− ∂π˜21 (z, 0)
∂z
¸
dz
¾
∂R∗1
∂λ2
−∂P (R
∗
1, R∗2)
∂R1
¡
V 22 − V 12
¢ ∂2R∗1
∂λ1∂λ2
+
dP (R∗1, R∗2)
dλ1
Z 1
α2
∙
∂π˜22 (0, z)
∂z
− ∂π˜22 (z, 0)
∂z
¸
dz, (57)
where
dP (R∗1, R∗2)
dλ1
=
∂P (R∗1, R∗2)
∂R1
∂R∗1
∂λ1
+
∂P (R∗1, R∗2)
∂R2
∂R∗2
∂λ1
.
Observe that the first term on the right hand side of (57) is positive, the third term is negative,
while the sign of the other terms is ambiguous. Hence, the sign of bˆλ02 (λ1) is ambiguous.
49
